A Political Interpretation of Vagueness Doctrine
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
11-9-2019
Abstract
The “void-for-vagueness” doctrine requires the specific definition of criminal offenses. In this Article, though, we claim it does more: it largely restricts criminalization decisions to legislatures, which are unlikely to criminalize conduct they see as both harmless and widespread. Thus, rather than constitutionalizing the harm principle and thereby assuming a judicial obligation to define harm, the Supreme Court has used the vagueness doctrine to constrain majorities to make their own assessments of harmfulness. While American law has no explicit requirements that criminal liability be created by legislation or conditioned on harm, the vagueness doctrine achieves those ends indirectly.
Publication Title
Illinois Law Review
First Page
1527
Last Page
1588
Recommended Citation
Guyora Binder & Brenner Fissell,
A Political Interpretation of Vagueness Doctrine,
2019
U. Ill. L. Rev.
1527
(2019).
Available at:
https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles/961
Comments
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