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This paper argues that analytical jurisprudence has been insufficiently attentive to three significant puzzles highlighted by the legal pluralist tradition: the existence of commonalities between different types of law, the possibility of a distinction between law and non-law, and the explanatory centrality of the state. I further argue that the resolution of these questions sets the stage for a renewed agenda of analytical jurisprudence and has to be considered in attempts for reconciliation between the academic traditions of analytical jurisprudence and legal pluralism, often called “pluralist jurisprudence.” I also argue that the resolution of these problems affects the empirical, doctrinal, and politico-moral inquiries about legal pluralism.
Canadian Journal of Law and Society
Jorge L. Fabra-Zamora,
The Conceptual Problems Arising from Legal Pluralism,
Canadian J.L. & Soc'y
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles/1063