International Political Economy and the Prisoner’s Dilemma: Compliance with International Law
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Description
Published as Chapter 8 in The Political Economy of International Law: A European Perspective, Alberta Fabricotti, ed.
This chapter explores the concept of the prisoner’s dilemma in the context of compliance with international law. It examines the prisoner’s dilemma in a variety of international law contexts, from which international law can be seen as explanandum in that a prisoner’s dilemma sometimes leads to the creation of international law. International law can also serve as explanans in the context of the prisoner’s dilemma, in that international law has consequences and effects for prisoner’s dilemmas while not always resolving them. The chapter also identifies some limitations of the prisoner’s dilemma, in particular by highlighting examples of political economy factors that confound the assumptions inherent to a prisoner’s dilemma analysis.
Publication Date
2016
Publisher
Edward Elgar
City
Northampton, MA
ISBN
9781785364396
First Page
178
Last Page
201
Keywords
political economy, international political economy, prisoner's dilemma, international law, compliance
Disciplines
Economic Policy | International Trade Law | Law
Recommended Citation
Meredith Kolsky Lewis, International Political Economy and the Prisoner’s Dilemma: Compliance with International Law in The Political Economy of International Law: A European Perspective 178 (Alberta Fabricotti, ed., Edward Elgar 2016)
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