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Published as Chapter 18 in Searching for Contemporary Legal Thought, Justin Desautels-Stein & Christopher Tomlins, eds.
The locution “law and . . . (some other discipline)” implicitly asserts the primacy of legal doctrine and institutions narrowly conceived for coming to understand phenomena in which law takes a part. The ordinary story of American legal theory – formalism then realism then contemporary legal thought – can be understood to repeat the triumphalism implicit in “law and . . .” Of course, the story of American legal theory could possibly be read differently -- as a series of responses to the inability of law to dictate the terms of its use and so as evidence law’s subordination to other ways of understanding such phenomena. Such a possibility would dictate a different ordering of important words into “. . . and Law.” This paper attempts to examine the plausibility of the latter locution by examining some of the crucial bodies of knowledge and recurrent actions of putatively non-legal actors that led up to the no longer recent Great Recession.
Rights
Publication Date
2017
Publisher
Cambridge University Press
City
New York
ISBN
9781107150676
First Page
348
Last Page
362
Keywords
contemporary legal theory, law and society, the Great Recession, banking, finance
Disciplines
Finance | Law | Law and Society | Legal Theory
Required Text
This material has been published in Searching for Contemporary Legal Thought edited by Justin Desautels-Stein & Christopher Tomlins. This version is free to view and download for personal use only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. © Cambridge University Press 2017.
Recommended Citation
John Henry Schlegel, . . . and Law? in Searching for Contemporary Legal Thought 348 (Justin Desautels-Stein & Christopher Tomlins, eds., Cambridge University Press 2017)