From Mallory to Morality: The Compatibility of Registration-Jurisdiction Laws with the Dormant Commerce Clause

Authors

Matthew J. O'Hara

Document Type

Article

Abstract

In June 2023, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., a case that threatened to cause the largest shift in personal jurisdiction law since Daimler AG and Bristol-Myers Squibb. While the Court upheld Pennsylvania’s registration jurisdiction law under the Due Process Clause and International Shoe’s “fair play and substantial justice” standard, Justice Alito’s concurrence opined that the law may violate the Dormant Commerce Clause (DCC). This Comment argues that registration-jurisdiction laws, which permit States to assert general personal jurisdiction over out-of-state businesses merely because they have registered to do business in the State, do not violate the DCC. First, these laws are not discriminatory, either on their face or in their practical effect, as they apply uniformly to all companies and do not grant any advantage to in-state companies over out-of-state companies. On the contrary, the laws seriously harm the economic interests of the enacting State. Second, registration-jurisdiction laws are justified under the Pike balancing test because States have a legitimate interest in providing a forum for out-of-state plaintiffs as a matter of ethical solidarity, even when the State itself derives no direct benefit. The nature of this ethical interest precludes weighing it against the economic burdens imposed by the laws. Consequently, registrationjurisdiction laws, such as the one at issue in Mallory, do not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause and should be upheld as a valid exercise of State power.

Recommended Citation

Matthew J. O'Hara, From Mallory to Morality: The Compatibility of Registration-Jurisdiction Laws with the Dormant Commerce Clause, 73 Buff. L. Rev. (2025).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol73/iss1/6